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This paper analyzes the macroeconomics of currency inconvertibility,
building on the role of relative prices in a portfolio balance model.
The relationship between black markets for foreign exchange and smuggling
is first analyzed from the perspective of an individual importer.
According to the portfolio view, the black market rate behaves like the
financial rate in a dual market. The premium of the black marlet rate
over the official rate is thus related to the probability of success in
smuggling and the tariff.
Then the black market is analyzed using a simple three-good,
two-asset general equilibrium model. Under theassumption ofregressive
exchange rate expectations, the portfolio view is contrasted with a
monetary approach to the black market. The short-run and long-run
effects of monetary and exchange rate policies on relative prices are
assessed. Different assumptions about expected returns are contrasted,
but emphasis is placed on the perfect foresight case. Unless expecta-
tions are static, official exchange rate policy has to adjust to the
private valuation of foreign exchange, as stressed in the conclusion.





Restricting the ability to convert the domestic currencyinto
foreign exchange may involve restrictions on internationaltrade or
capital movements: currency inconvertibility is to beunderstood relative
to particular items in the balance of recorded international
transactions.1 While inconvertibility promotes smuggling and black
markets for foreign exchange, these may exist even when a currencyis
legally "convertible". In effect, the definition in theArticles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund only requiresthe absence of
restrictions on current account transactions.
Some basic features of the black market for foreign exchange canbe
derived in partial equilibrium models. The relationship betweenrecorded
trade, smuggling and the demand for and supply of blackmarket foreign
exchange is evident in the choice between importing at theofficial
exchange rate plus the tariff or at the black market rate.Under incon-
vertibility, therefore, domestic and foreign assets are not perfect
substitutes. Applying the conventional monetary approach -whereassets
(and goods) are assumed to be perfect substitutes -tothe inconvertible
exchange rate would be misleading. On the contrary, the portfolio
approach assumes a stock demand for the foreign, as well asfor the
domestic, currency and does not require perfect goods arbitrage.It can
thus explain the observed diversification of currency portfoliosand
provide a useful framework in which to analyze macro—economic policy
under inconvertibility.-2-
The paper is divided into two parts. Part I contains a partial
equilibrium model of the black market for foreign exchange which brings
together the smuggling literature and the portfolio view. Different
mechanisms of expectations formation are contrasted, but emphasis is
placed on the perfect foresight case. It is shown under what condition
the premium of the black market rate over the official rate is likely to
be positively related to the probability of success in smuggling, along
the lines of the classic "Beccaria formula".
In Part II, the black market for foreign exchange is analyzed using
a simple three-good, two-asset general equilibrium model in the spirit of
Kouri (1975). Under the assumption of "stabilizing", or regressive,
expectations about returns to domestic and foreign currencies, the
portfolio view is contrasted in section 2 with the monetary model of
Blejer (1978a). Then, assuming static expectations, the black market
premium (which is also the relative price of traded goods) and the
relative price of non—traded goods are endogenously determined in tempo-
rary equilibrium (section 3), while the asset mix isdetermined in
steady- state equilibrium (section 4). The effects of monetary and
exchange rate policies on relative prices and asset stocks are analyzed
in this set-up. The implications of perfect foresight are explored in
Section 5. The conclusion summarizes the results.
I.Partial equilibrium
1.The Beccaria formula
The formal analysis on black markets can be traced back to the mid-
eighteenth century, when -asHume was writing on the specie-flow mecha-
nism -Beccaria(1764-65) developed a break-even condition for smuggling-3-
activity, involving the probability of. success and the tariff rate on
imports:
(1) ztl
where z is the probability of success in smuggling
and t is one plus the tariff rate
A higher degree of enforcement of tariff regulations -tothe extent
that is implies a lower z -isassociated with negative profits from
smuggling unless a higher rate raises the domestic price and thus re-
stores profitability. The objective of the analysis was precisely
directing the attention of policy-makers to the trade-off between the
revenue from higher tariffs and the associated higher enforcementcosts.3
After some centuries of neglect, the literature picked up about ten
years ago. Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) -whorefer to Beccaria's work -
showedthat tariffs do induce smuggling but, together with Sheikh (1974),
they claimed that a black market for foreign exchange would not be
induced by trade restrictions alone. Sheikh (1976) adapted the tradi-
tional analysis of black markets by Michaely (1954) and others to the
foreign exchange market.4
By introducing real costs to smuggling in the form of a "smuggling
function", Pitt (1981) and (1982) showed that legal and illegal trade in
goods and money coexist even in the absence of exchange restrictions. If
some legal trade is necessary in order to engage in smuggling, the
domestic price may be less than the cost of legal imports, a phenomenon-4-
which he calls "price disparity". Along the same lines, Martinand
Panagaryia (1983) propose a crime-theoretic approach to smuggling,which
provides microeconomic foundations to Pitt's smugglingfunction but they
neglect the black market for foreign exchange.
Noting that this revival of interest in the supervision aspectwould have
pleased Beccaria, a criminologist by training, we will showhow the
Pitt-Martin-Panagaryia (PMP) analysis is consistent with his formula,
modified to allow for a black market for foreign exchange. In fact, the
black market premium is a measure of the cost of smuggling. We begin by
describing how this premium is determined in a portfolio model.
2.A portfolio model
Consider a small country whose residents are not authorized to hold
foreign assets, but who nevertheless allocate theirfinancial wealth
between domestic and foreign currency.5 The terms of trade between legal
("official") and illegal ("smuggled") imports and exports are givenin
the world market. Alternatively, as is done below, the same good is
traded through both channels and there is a non-traded good.
If foreigners do not hold the inconvertible domestic currencyin
their portfolios, the domestic currency price of foreign currencyin the
black market will be such that the existing stock is willinglyheld.
Furthermore, the only way for domestic residents to acquire foreign
currency is through the underinvoicing of exportsand the overinvoicing
of imports. In the absence of endogenous reported capital flowsand
errors and omissions, as well as interest payments onunrecorded capital
flows, excess supply of the two traded goods equals the changein the-5-
stock of foreign currency of the private sector and the central bank
respectively.
The black market rate is determined so that the private stock of
black market foreign exchange is willingly held, and demand a is propor-
tional to wealth for simplicity. Demand increases with expected depreci-
ation of the black market rate or with a higher probability of success in
smuggling:
(2) eF =a(&Ii,z)W c =
a4i/a
y=az/a
where e is the black market exchange rate
F is the stock of black market foreign exchange (in foreign
currency)
W is private financial wealth (in domestic currency)
and 4isthe expected rate of change of the black market rate.
The measure of relative real return is the expected change in the
black market rate because domestic residents are assumed to be identical
in their consumption preferences.6
Given an official exchange •rate, ,therequirement of portfolio
balance can be written in terms of the black market premium and of
financial wealth valued at the official rate:
(3)pFa
where p =e/is the black market premium-6—
and =W/is financial wealth valued at the official exchange
rate.
The change in F is given by smuggling and other unreported current
account transactions. The unreported surplus, B, is zero for a particu-
lar value of the premium, taken to be one, and, if the elasticities
condition holds, improves with an increase in the premium. Denoting
rates of change by dots:
(4) F =B(p)B(1) =0Bt >0
Assuming that the opposite holds for the reported trade surplus, IL
weshow temporary equilibrium in Figure 1, a variant of the Kouri (1983)
diagram. The right panel shows the instantaneous determination of the
black market exchange rate, given demand for foreign currency and no
expected change in relative returns, along a rectangular hyperbola PP.
Under perfect foresight, demand for foreign currency will increase when
the black market rate depreciates, constraining its initial value for a
given stock of foreign currency F0 to e, on the saddle path S (below
the corresponding initial value under static expectations, e0). For a
given official exchange rate, (< e0 so that p0 >1),the left panel of
Figure 1 plots the unreported trade surplus in foreign currency, B (which
equals the increase in F) and the exogenous reported trade deficit, -.
Assuminga stronger effect of the black market rate on B, the relative
slopes will be as drawn. For simplicity, assume that the unreported
trade balance equilibrium associated with the given official exchange





















If the associated reported deficit is corrected by devaluation
of the official exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium level, ,the
two schedules will shift up and intersect on the vertical axis at a point
where, by choice of units, e1 = sothat p1 =1.The implications of
the official devaluation differ depending on the expectations formation
mechanism. If expectations are static, the black market exchange rate
will gradually depreciate from e0 to e1 as the stock of foreign assets
decreases from F0 to F1. Under perfect foresight, the black market rate
jumps from to e and then gradually depreciates to the same long-run
value. If the official devaluation generates an increase in the demand
for foreign assets from PP to P2P2, furthermore, the black market rate
will overshoot to e2 (e under perfect foresight) and gradually
appreciate back to e1 as the stock of foreign assets increases to F.
The same would be true of an exogenous increase in z: in the short-run
the premium would rise, in the long-run F would rise.
The analysis remains applicable under a crawling peg regime, where
the rate of depreciation equals the reported trade deficit as a propor-
tion of central bank reserves. It does, however, assume that these are
large enough, so as to be able to neglect the "collapse problem"of
Krugman (1979).
3. Special risks
Consider the profit p in domestic currency of a price-taking import-
er. It varies depending on whether smuggling is successful or not
Setting the foreign currency price at unity, we get profits as a-8—




where P is the domestic price
L is the amount legally imported
S is the amount smuggled
Under perfect competition, profits will be zero at the optimum,
which is independent of demand conditions. If the probability of success
is exogenous to the firm, expected profits will also be linear in the
decision variables, S and L, since they are a z—weighted average of (5)
and (6):
(7) p=zpz +(1—z)p12
The basic idea behind the so-called "crimetheoretic" approach is,
however, to make the special risks, measured by the probability of
success, depend on the decision variables of the firm. Assume itis a
decreasing function of the ratio of smuggled to legal imports.
(8) z =z(s);=-sz'/z—9—
S where s=
Using (3) and (8) in (7), first-order conditions for profitmaximization
can be solved for the optimal combination of price and import pattern,
given the tariff and the premium:
(9) (1 +zCs)=t+ysp LL locus
(10) z(1 -C) = p(1
- SSlocus
where =P/
To preserve the zero-profit condition for legal imports in (9), an
increase in the smuggling ratio requires a lower price in terms of the
official exchange rate if both z and p are elastic or inelastic with
respect to s and z respectively. This implies a downward slopingLL
locus. If one of the functions is elastic and the other is inelastic,







To preserve the zero-profit condition for smuggling imports in (10),
an increase in the smuggling ratio requires a higher price unless p is
elastic with respect to the probability of success. The slope of the SS
locus is given by:-10-
12 dP J — 1-y_zp
/ ds I (i_t'2s
ss
Adapting a diagram from Martin and Panagaryia (1983), we present the
inelastic case (y, <1)in Figure 2. An increase in the tariff from
to t1 raisesand s. A decrease in z (or F) from z0 (or FO) to z1 (or
F1) raisebut lowers s.
Now eliminatingbetween (9) and (10) we obtain a more general
version of the Beccaria formula:
(13) zt =pA
where A1-[Y•zs(1y)1
Note first that, if demand for black market foreign exchange in-
creases in proportion with the probability of success (y1) or if z is
exogenously given (C= 0),then A =1in (13). This is a sufficient
condition for the premium to be less than the tariff (t >p).Put
another way, given the probability of success in smuggling, an increase
in the premium lowers profits unless there is an increase in the tariff.
The Beccaria is now between more supervision (lowering z)and a higher
tariff or an official devaluation (lowering p/t).
On the other hand, a new trade-off arose between profits from the
smuggling activity and profits in the black market for foreign exchange.
Higher supervision of smuggling is now associated with a lower black
















While some basic features of the black market for foreign exchange
can be derived in partial equilibrium models, the interaction between the
private and official valuation of foreign exchange, on the one hand, and
the role of the black market premium as a relative price, on the other,
call for a general equilibrium approach. In the model presented next, we
determine not only the black market premium but also the relative price
of non-traded goods, their ratio being the real exchange rate. To
sharpen the analysis, we will ne.glect the role of the black market
premium emphasized in the previous section, namely determining whether a




Exports and imports are either traded through the official market or
smuggled. Their prices in foreign currency are determined in the world
market. It would, of course, be possible to reinterpret the results in
terms of the Beccaria analysis by allowing for a tariff on the official
import.
Using the wealth definition, the portfolio balance condition is (3)
becomes:
(14)pFlaa
A.. A...• where N M/e is the domestic money stock, N, valued at the official-12-
rate
h =eF/FIis the currency ratio
and1(1+h)
The assumption of regressive expectations implies, in turn, that:
(15) =);=
Excess-supplyfunctions for the official traded good, the smuggled
good and the non-traded good depend on prices (e,and and wealth.
An income effect could easily be added but, as noted by Kouri (1975), it
would be irrelevant. We take the official exchange rate as the
numeraire.
The market for non-traded goods is always in equilibrium. Neglect-
ing the cross-price effect (and indicating the sign of the partial
derivatives over the respective argument), excess supply for non-traded
goods is given by:
+-
(16) N(q, )= 0
where q =PNIe
is the relative price of the non-traded good.
As mentioned, excess supply for traded goods equals the accumulation
of foreign currency by the central bank and the private sector through
the reported and unreported trade balances respectively. The domestic
money stock is made up of domestic credit (C) and foreign exchange-13-
reserves, valued at the official exchange rate. The balance of payments
is the only endogenous source of money creation: capital gains on the
foreign currency value of reserves go into central bank net-worth forev-
er. Neglecting reported capital flows, (and denoting proportional rates
of change by hats), we get:
+-
(17) F =B(p,q,
(18) =(p,;, + Ôi1
C "
where 6 -e
2.A Comparison of stock and flow specifications
If 60 but the excess supply of traded goods is zero, we obtain
from log differention of (14) and (16) the solution for the change in the
relative prices as a function of 6:
(19) q= 8
(20)= 8
where =-N/3is the positive semi-elasticity of the excess
supply of non-traded goods with respect of real wealth;-14-
V =-qN/qis the positive semi-elasticity of the excess
supply of non—traded goods with respect to the relative
price of non-traded goods.
and c = isthe positive elasticity of h with respect to the
premium.
We contrast (19) and (20) with the flow specification of the black
market rate due to Blejer (1978a). His model collapses into the usual
monetarist model of exchange rate determination when the real official
exchange rate is fixed by a purchasing-power-parity reactionfunction)°
To make the models compatible, this last aspect and many inessential
complications are ignored.
Arguing that excess demand for non-traded goods is a given fraction,
t, of excess demand in the goods market, and therefore of the ex-ante
excess supply of money, Blejer posits that changes in the relative price
of non-traded goods are proportional to 5:
(21) q =
Byinterpreting t as (21) is of course the same as (19). The
difference comes from the specification of the black market for foreign
exchange in flow terms. Supply per unit of time, sB, is a positive
function of the black market premium:
(22) log =
c11+ c12 log p
Demand per unit of time, DB, is a positive function of the expected
rate of change of the black market rate and a negative function of-15-
expected inflation, as proxies for the real return to holding black
market foreign exchange and holding the non-traded good. Since own and
cross effects are the same, and expectations are assumed to be regres-
13
sive, we get:
(23) log DB =c21 - c22 log
where =e/P
Note that (23) is not consistent with domestic residents having the same
consumption preferences, as assumed in (12), where ,ratherthan the
expected change in ,measuresthe real return differential.
Log differentiating (22) and (23) and equating yields a link between





Substituting (24) into (21) we obtain, instead of (20):
(25) pctô
According to (25), the effect on the premium isdampened by Ct < 1.
Clearly, if q is not responsive to ô and t =0,the black market premium
is constant. The same happens when the flow supply of foreign exchange-16—
does not respond to the premium -saybecause expectations are static -
andc =0.
However in (20), if =0we get p =ô=q/t,so that the premium
moves by more than the relative price of non-traded goods, as seems
plausible. The equilibrium is now at E' in Figure 3, and the flow model
understates the change in the premium by EtE. Since>0,under
regressive expectations the premium will be lower. It will nevertheless
be larger than at E if the elasticity of expectations and of the currency
ratio are sufficiently larger than the ratio of the flow supply and





We now analyze, in the case =y0, the temporary equilibrium of
the system, where excess supply for traded goods is non-zero, and
steady-state equilibrium, where asset stocks are constant.
12
3.Temporary equilibrium
Equations (14) and (16) determine the relative prices of the smug-
gled and non-traded good in terms of the numeraire, given asset stocks.
An increase in the return to foreign assets (or in the probability of
success in smuggling) would increase h, that is the black market rate.
For a given h, (14) states that there is a single value of p consistent








matched by an increase in wealth, that is in p, in order to eliminate the
associated excess-supply of non-traded goods.
(26)pa-F
(27)
According to (26) and 27), an increase in foreign money decrease p
and leaves q unchanged, while domestic monetary expansion increases p
one-to-one and q by t.If the relative price effect dominates the wealth
effect (t < 1), then, domestic monetary expansion will imply a real
depreciation of the black market rate expressed in terms of non-traded
goods. The same will be true for a once-and-for-all devaluation of the
official exchange rate, which leaves the demand for foreign currency
unchanged, so p falls, and generates an excess demand for non-traded
goods, so q falls:
(28)
It can similarly be shown that an increase in h will increase p more
than q (i.e. lead to a real depreciation) unless t > 1 + 1/h.
4.Steady-state equilibrium
Steady-state asset stock are such that, aside from portfolio balance
and equilibrium in the non-traded goods market, there is zero-18-
excess-supply of the smuggled good, so that B =0and, therefore, zero
excess-supply of the official traded good as well,=0.We thus need 6
=0in steady-state.
Substituting for p and q from the temporary equilibrium equations,
the asset accumulation equations in (17) and (18) can be used to show
that the reported (unreported) trade balances deteriorate sufficiently
with increases in domestic (foreign) currency for the system to be
stable.
Consider now the steady-state effects of monetary and exchange rate
policies when the currency ratio is fixed. The total differential of the
system can be expressed as a function of disturbances which affect the
currency ratio and official exchange rate policies:
1 0 -1 1 p h
0 q cnuNdh+(vuiN)e
(29)
.'..',', -it-p-w0 ciw dh -(n+p+w)e-Mdô
it-p-w0 F aw dh
where (n) is the positive semi-elasticity of (B) with
respect to the premium
11(p) is the positive semi-elasticity of (B) with respect
to the relative price of non-traded goods;
and (w) is the positive semi-elasticity of (B) with
respect to real wealth-19—
A once-and-for-all devaluation leaves the stock of foreign assets
unchanged and raises e, N and N in proportion, so that p, q andare
also unchanged. An increase in domestic credit creation -ora decline









When own-price effects are stronger than wealth and cross-price
effects, it > .Then,when ô rises, p rises by less than i, so that F
rises. Defining ratjos of semi-elasticities, as in (21) above, we can
rewrite the condition in (33) as:
(33') 1- 4t> t'
where =p/n
and t'= w/it.-20-
The condition for a real depreciation when the rate of crawl in-
creases (or, equivalently, for a fall inafter a rise in 6) is stronger
13
than (33 ).Itis given by:
(34) (1 —4)t> t'
An increase in h has no steady-state effects on relative prices. It
increases F by 1 + a and decreases by a.Wenow allow for endogenous
changes in h. Rather than making the currency ratio a function of the
premium, though, we focus on the case of perfect foresight.
4.The implication of perfect foresight
The well-known portfolio model of flexible exchange rates with
non-traded goods of Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) asssumes that expectations
about relative returns are continuously realized, so that i =e.Using
this in (14) and inverting, we obtain a differential equation for the
black market rate. Since the rate of change of is pegged to the rate
of crawl by the assumption that the market for non-traded goods clears,
we solve out for q. We also assume that the official rate is constant.
Then we express the system in terms of p, fandF by taking a linear
approximation around steady-state equilibrium, where p =1by choice of
units.-21-




Tosolve the characteristic equation of the system in (35) we assume
that Q =andobtain:
14
(36) X2[1 - + c2)]+x(÷ 11) ÷ Qil =0
where fl=it-t-it









The solution is therefore saddle-point-stable with one direction of
instability associated with the jump variable p and two directions of
stability associated with the assets stocks.
Suppose now that a crawling peg policy is implemented from a
steady-state situation where the rate of crawl is zero. In steady-state
the premium is constant, so that the rate of depreciation of the black
market rate has to increase. This makes foreign currency more attractive
and raises the currency ratio.
Suppose now that the expected rate of change of the black market is
given by the rate of crawl, 4= , thecase of hyperopic expectation)5
The currency ratio also increases.
We now return to the diagram in the right panel of Figure 1 above,
in order to represent a simplified version of the general equilibrium
system, given by a monetary policy such that =0at all times, so that
we can solve out forand obtain a two-by-two dynamic system. Using the








The trace of the matrix in (40) is positive and the determinant is
negative, so that once again the roots are of opposite sign and the-23—
system is saddle-point stable. Since the wealth effects cancel, the
locus'where F =0is horizontal in p, F space, and defines the long-run
valueof the premium.16. The linear approximation to the portfolio
balance locus,=0,has negative slope less than one in absolute value,
given by (t+ t)/(1+' + t). Nowreinterpret Figure 1 as if the
premium were measured on the vertical axis, and the F =0locus were a
straight line. Then, as stated in Part I, under perfect foresight,
demand for foreign currency increases when the black market rate depreci-
ates, constraining its initial value for a given stock of foreign curren-
cy to a value below the corresponding initial value under static
expectations. The effect of an increase in the demand for foreign assets
is also smaller than under static expectations. It is followed by a
continuous decline of the black market premium along a higher perfect
foresight path. Conversely, the effect of an exogenous increase in the
foreign demand for the smuggled good is a downward shift in the F =0
locus, which leads to a jump fall in p and a continuous decline along a
lower perfect foresight path to F2. Under static expectations, there
would be no jumpfall,in p, but only a decline along the portfolio
balance locus.
Conclusion
The paper has analyzed regimes of currency inconvertibility using
the portfolio approach to exchange rate determination developed by Kouri
(1983) and others. Reference was also made to a "crime-theoretict'
approach pioneered by Beccaria (1764) and to the monetary approach of
Blejer (1978a). In a simple three—good, two-asset general equilibrium-24-
model, the condition for a crawling peg to induce real depreciation of
the black market rate in terms of non-traded goods was shown to be the
dominance of the price effect over the wealth effect. Increases in the
demand for foreign assets increase relative prices in the short-run and
the currency ratio in the long-run.
Allowing the currency ratio to be changed by monetary and exchange
rate policy, it was shown that, under perfect foresight, it would be
raised by an increase in the rate of crawl. The assumption of perfect
foresight may seem particularly strained in a black market, but the
result also holds when expectations are hyperopic, so, in the long run
that the private valuation of foreign currency adjusts to the official
one.
The contrast of the various expectations formation mechanisms brings
out an important dilemma of currency inconvertibility. If the monetary
authorities believe that, in the long-run, the private valuation of
foreign currency adjusts to the official one, they also have to accept
that the wrong exchange rate policy will set the black market for foreign
exchange off the stable path where expectations are continuously real-
ized, making domestic money worthless. To rule out destabilizing expec-
tations, the official valuation has to adjust to the private valuation,
as in a dual market for foreign exchange.
Such a regime has the advantage of giving a warning signal which may
prevent the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. The literature on
this latter issue, beyond the scope of the present paper, has been
surveyed by Garber (1983), who mentions in passing the potential role of
a dual exchange rate in preventing the speculative attack. This, in-25-
turn, provides a justification for the weak standard of convertibility
found in the 11fFArticlesof Agreement.-26-
NOTES
1.Thus, restricting convertibility for current account transactions
would tend to promote factor mobility and trade in assets.
Conversely restricting convertibility for capital account transac-
tions would tend to promote trade in goods.
2. In response to the greater mobility of capital, some governments
have attempted to recapture foreign exchange by offering special
advantages to the types of transactions, where evasion of exchange
controls would be easier, like tourist services and migrant's
remittances. According to the IMP's latest Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, only 33 out of 148
member countries have fully convertible currencies, while 67
(Western Europe, Middle-East and Latin America) have accepted
convertibility for current account transactions only.
3.As Cooper (1974) showed for the case of Indonesia, tariff collec-
tions as a percent of imports were less than schedule rates at
higher duties because of the increased incentive to smuggling
activity. While higher collections are presumably achievable with
greater law enforcement, net revenues might still be less than
proportional to rates.
4.A brief survey of this literature is in Macedo (1979).
5.See Macedo (1982a) and (1982b, Essay III) and Dornbusch et al.
(1983) for the analysis of black markets for foreign exchange in
Egypt, Portugal and Brazil, respectively, using the portfolio
approach.—27—
6.Strictly speaking, this also requires constant expenditure shares.
See Kouri (1975, P. 77, note 1).
7.The "collapse" literature is surveyed by Garber (1983).
8.In the case where LL is upward sloping, the existence of a solution
(A >0)requires that, when>1and 1 >yzs/(1 +zs),we also
have [y -zs(1 -y)}>1,so that A <1and if A <z,then t <p.
9. In Macedo (1982b, Essay II), S, L and their ratios depend on p. An
alternative, suggested by Al Fishlow, would be to make the ratio a
function of 4s.
10. Other references in the monetarist spirit are Culbertson (1975) who
used annual data on black market rates in India, the Philippines and
Turkey for purchasing power parity calculations; Giddy (1978) who
attempted to show the "efficiency" of black markets for foreign
exchange in Columbia, Brazil and Israel by testing the randomness of
the black market premium and changes therein using weekly data;
Blejer (1978b) who used annual data on a black-market-based real
exchange rate for Brazil, Chile and Colombia to estimate money
demand functions in these countries; and Canto (1983), who performed
time-series analysis on data from the Dominican Republic.
11. Under rational expectations the "real rate"would be a double
exponential function of time.
12. See the analysis in Macedo (1983) for the cases where 0, so that
the currency ratio changes, where there are terms-of-trade changes
and where alternative assumptions about capital gain on reserves are
explored.
13. This real appreciation is used to characterize the "Egyptian dis-
ease" in Macedo (1982a).-28-
14. This allows it becausethe elasticity relative to the nuineraire
can also differ.
15. See Allen and Kenen (1980, p. 242).
16. If, instead, we assumed that =atall times, the F =0locus
would be upward sloping because of the wealth effect. None of the
conclusions would be changed.-29-
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